The Nature of Future Conflict by Richard Connaughton

Author:Richard Connaughton [Connaughton, Richard]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Wars & Conflicts (Other), General
ISBN: 9781473816633
Google: XSXAAwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Published: 1995-09-11T02:54:15+00:00

These principles go some way towards bringing order to what has often been a disorderly scrum. Responsible journalists, often those with national forces engaged, will conform. What these principles do not and cannot address are the rogue or paparazzi reporters, often with no national interest, whose stimulation is ego or financially based.

Agree and adhere to national contributions. Sheer demand has meant that there has been no slack in the system to test this principle in relation to civil conflict. Only 7500 troops were found to be available worldwide in June, 1993, to enhance the UN’s intended position in the former Yugoslavia. This was despite the tapping of new sources, including Japan’s tentative operations in Cambodia and Mozambique and, following a domestic legal tussle, the deployment of 1500 German soldiers into safe areas in Somalia.

Well trained, equipped and disciplined forces are at a premium for deployment into Chapter VI½ conflict environments. Their nonavailability often means that troops unsuited to the task are sent instead. Part of the problem revolves around Europe busily making unilateral reductions in force structures and hence reducing the ability to contribute to international collective security. Moreover, the force levels in a number of European countries are deceptive because they include high proportions of conscripts.

In the case of the French armed forces, they appear particularly strong. For example, the French army with a strength of 280,000 looks tantalisingly capable of responding to a range of overseas conflicts. When the cover is removed, however, what is revealed is something of a curate’s egg à la nouvelle cuisine – good in parts, but rather thinly spread. The regular or volunteer component is only 107,000 strong. The rest are conscripts serving for just ten months. They cannot be ordered abroad unless war is declared. The strength of the French Air Force is 93,000 and the Navy 65,000, larger than their British counterparts but smaller in proportion to the number of volunteers. The unequal mix of volunteers and regulars in units caused the French considerable embarrassment during the course of deployment into the Gulf. As a result, their 50,000-strong, quick reaction force, the Force d’Action Rapide, now comprises a higher proportion of volunteers.

By the end of 1994 the Bundeswehr, having absorbed the East German Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), had reached a ceiling of 370,000: 257,800 in the Army; 83,200 in the Air Force; and 29,000 in the Navy. 155,000, or over forty per cent, are conscripts, up to 38,000 of whom may voluntarily extend their service to 15 or 18 months.

The relevance and ease of employability of the conscript seems to have largely passed in the new conflict environment. There are residual reasons for their retention in terms of national character-building and the establishment of an expansion base. In Germany their welfare organizations would crumble were it not for a significant infusion of conscientious objectors. But conscripts do allow the maintenance of large, cost-effective, traditional, continental armies. Conscripts are paid significantly less than volunteers and they do not attract the additional liabilities of family quarters and pensions.

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